

The Effect of Reward and Punishment on Employee Performance at the Harbor Master and Port Authority Office Class IV Bengkalis

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ABSTRACT



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Improving employee performance is essential for strengthening public service delivery, and this concern underlies the present research at Kantor Kesyahbandaran dan Otoritas Pelabuhan Kelas IV Bengkalis. Although the institution already applies a system of reward and punishment intended to raise employee performance, whether this system actually works as intended has not yet been tested empirically. Accordingly, this research set out to measure how Reward and Punishment influence employee performance, both jointly and on their own. A quantitative design built around multiple linear regression was applied, with data processed in SPSS. Because the workforce was small, every one of the 32 employees was included as a respondent through saturated sampling. Beyond regression, the analysis covered correlation testing, the coefficient of determination, and hypothesis testing through the F-test and t-test. Findings indicate that Reward correlates strongly with performance ($r = 0.675$), whereas Punishment shows a more moderate association ($r = 0.487$); combined, the two predictors account for 61.8% of the variance in performance (Adjusted $R^2 = 0.618$). Simultaneous testing confirms that Reward and Punishment together exert a significant positive influence on performance, and this pattern holds when each variable is examined separately as well. On this basis, applying Reward and Punishment in a fair, consistent, and objective manner appears capable of raising employee performance and, in turn, strengthening the quality of public service the institution provides.

Keywords: *Employee Performance, Harbor Master, Port Authority, Punishment and Reward*

1. Introduction

Rising expectations for public-sector service quality have made employee performance a central concern for government institutions operating in the port sector. Since organizational success largely hinges on how well human resources are managed, many institutions turn to a balanced reward-and-punishment system as a practical lever for driving performance. Beyond its role in day-to-day motivation, this balance also matters for accountability: employees who see rewards distributed fairly and sanctions applied consistently tend to trust that institutional rules apply equally to everyone, which in turn supports a more stable and predictable work environment.

Among the institutions tasked with this balance is the Harbor Master and Port Authority Office (Kantor Kesyahbandaran dan Otoritas Pelabuhan/KSOP) Class IV Bengkalis, a government body whose duties span law enforcement at sea, coordination across agencies, and issuing sailing clearance documents (Ministry of Transportation of the Republic of Indonesia, 2023). To motivate its staff, the office grants rewards such as overtime pay, service-post allowances, formal recognition for disciplined work, and periodic salary increases, while sanctioning misconduct through a tiered punishment scheme that begins with a verbal warning and can extend to delayed

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promotion depending on how serious the violation is. Yet despite years of running both policies side by side, nobody had formally examined whether they actually move the needle on performance among the office's 32 employees.

Excessive reward without a balancing punishment risks lowering work discipline, while excessive punishment without reward can reduce morale and trigger employee resistance. This finding is in line with Brilliantisyah et al. (2024), who showed that a proportionate implementation of reward and punishment plays an important role in improving employee performance. Given this, the present study sets out to close that gap by empirically testing how reward and punishment shape performance at KSOP Class IV Bengkalis, looking at their combined and individual contributions to inform how the office manages its workforce going forward.

The stakes of getting this balance right are not purely internal. As a front-line government office responsible for issuing sailing permits and enforcing maritime regulations, KSOP Class IV Bengkalis interacts directly with shipping operators, crew members, and the wider public who depend on its services running smoothly. Lapses in employee performance at such an office can ripple outward into delayed permits, inconsistent enforcement, or diminished public trust in the institution's oversight role. Understanding what actually drives performance here therefore carries weight beyond the office's internal management, extending to the broader reliability of maritime administration in the Bengkalis region.

Based on the above, this study aims to analyze the simultaneous and partial effects of reward and punishment on the performance of employees at the Harbor Master and Port Authority Office Class IV Bengkalis. The findings are expected to provide practical input for the institution's human resource policy while also adding to the still-limited body of empirical work on reward and punishment within Indonesian port-sector government offices.

2. Literature Review

2.1 Employee Performance (Y)

Performance can be understood as an employee's capacity to meet job requirements, reflected in whether assigned targets are completed within the given time frame and in accordance with the organization's standards and values (Husna & Prasetya, 2024). It represents the tangible outcome of work carried out, recorded in a way that allows the gap between actual and expected achievement to be evaluated (Tupti et al., 2022). Put differently, performance is the end result of a process measured against quality and quantity benchmarks set beforehand (Putri et al., 2023), or the outcome an employee produces when judged against criteria relevant to a specific job (Budiyanto & Mochklas, 2020).

Soedarmayanti (2021) identifies five indicators commonly used to gauge employee performance: (1) productivity, comparing output against the resources used to produce it; (2) quality, reflecting how employees perceive the standard of work delivered relative to their skills; (3) efficiency, or how well resources are conserved during the work process; (4) timeliness, meaning tasks are completed within the intended schedule while leaving room for other activities; and (5) initiative, the capacity to identify problems and take the first productive step toward resolving them.

These five dimensions are treated in this study not as isolated checkboxes but as interconnected facets of the same underlying construct: an employee who is timely but careless, for instance, would still score poorly overall, just as one who is highly skilled but consistently late would. Measuring performance across all five together, rather than relying on a single proxy such as output volume, gives a more balanced picture of how well KSOP Class IV Bengkalis employees are actually carrying out their duties, and is the approach adopted throughout the remainder of this study.

2.2 Reward (X1)

Reward can be defined as a form of appreciation aimed at retaining professional employees suited to their job demands, requiring balanced efforts in planning, organizing, deploying, and maintaining the workforce so that tasks are carried out effectively (Handoko, in Riansyah, 2021). Novalia & Candra (2024) add that reward is an instrument organizations use to encourage employees toward optimal contribution, spanning not only quantitative elements such as salary but also non-financial aspects like broader responsibility, career growth, and opportunities to learn. Lestari & Saroyo (2022) similarly describe reward as material or verbal appreciation given in recognition of an achievement.

Mahmudi (2019) proposes four indicators of reward: (1) salary increases and bonuses, covering base-pay raises, additional honoraria, and short- or long-term incentives; (2) welfare benefits, such as allowances, work facilities, and spiritual or recreational support; (3) career development, including further study, training, workshops, and comparative study assignments; and (4) psychological and social recognition, such as promotion, trust, expanded responsibility, and greater autonomy.

2.3 Punishment (X2)

Punishment refers to the imposition of an undesirable consequence intended to discourage unwanted behavior (Purnomo et al., 2021). Brilliantisyah et al. (2024) describe it as an unpleasant consequence delivered by a superior in response to a particular act, while

Mangkunegara (in Suak, cited in Sembiring & Sandra, 2021) frames punishment as a threatened sanction meant to correct offending employees, uphold existing rules, and serve as a lesson to the wider workforce.

Rivai (2018) groups punishment indicators into tiers of severity: mild punishment, such as verbal or written warnings issued for minor infractions; and more serious sanctions applied as violations escalate. In practice, institutions typically calibrate the sanction to the severity of the offense, ranging from a simple reprimand to more consequential administrative penalties.

2.4 Research Framework and Hypotheses

Drawing on the literature above, reward and punishment are positioned as independent variables expected to shape employee performance, either separately or in combination. Reward is expected to raise performance by reinforcing desired behavior through salary increases, welfare support, career development, and social recognition, while punishment is expected to contribute by discouraging misconduct and reinforcing adherence to institutional standards. Building on this framework, three hypotheses guided the analysis: H1, reward has a positive and significant effect on employee performance; H2, punishment has a positive and significant effect on employee performance; and H3, reward and punishment simultaneously have a positive and significant effect on employee performance.

This framework treats reward and punishment as complementary rather than competing mechanisms: an institution that only rewards without ever sanctioning poor conduct risks normalizing underperformance, while one that only punishes without recognizing good work risks demotivating its staff over time. Testing both variables together, rather than in isolation, therefore allows the study to capture how these two levers interact in practice at KSOP Class IV Bengkalis, and provides a more complete basis for the institution to calibrate its human resource policy going forward.

3. Method

To capture how reward (X1) and punishment (X2) relate to and shape employee performance (Y), this research relied on a quantitative, associative design (Sugiyono, 2022), carried out at KSOP Class IV Bengkalis between January and July 2026.

All 32 active employees at the institution formed the population, and because this number was already small, no sample was drawn separately — the whole population was treated as respondents through a saturated-sampling approach. A 1–5 Likert questionnaire served as the main data-collection instrument, complemented by direct observation and interviews, while institutional records supplied secondary information.

Operationally, reward (X1) was measured through the indicators outlined in the literature review — salary increases and bonuses, welfare benefits, career development, and psychological or social recognition — while punishment (X2) was captured through the tiered severity of sanctions ranging from verbal warnings to more serious administrative penalties. Employee performance (Y), the dependent variable, was assessed using the productivity, quality, efficiency, timeliness, and initiative indicators described earlier. Each indicator was translated into several questionnaire statements, which respondents rated on the 1–5 Likert scale before the item-level scores were aggregated into a single score per variable for the correlation and regression analyses.

Before the main analysis, each questionnaire item was checked for validity by weighing the computed *r*-value against the *r*-table threshold of 0.361 (*df* = 30, α = 0.05), and reliability was confirmed once Cronbach's alpha exceeded 0.60 (Ghozali, 2016). The dataset then passed through a standard battery of classical assumption checks — normality (via histogram, normal probability plot, and the Shapiro-Wilk test), linearity, heteroscedasticity, and multicollinearity (assessed through VIF and tolerance values) — to confirm the regression model's suitability.

SPSS version 25 handled the statistical work: Pearson Product Moment correlation to gauge relationships, an Adjusted R Square calculation to capture how much variance was explained, and a multiple linear regression fitted as $Y = a + b_1X_1 + b_2X_2$. Whether the resulting hypotheses held up was then checked using an *F*-test for the variables' joint effect and separate *t*-tests for each one, applying a 0.05 significance threshold throughout (Kurniawan, 2017).

4. Results and Discussion

4.1 Respondent Profile

The research sample consisted of 32 employees of KSOP Class IV Bengkalis. A summary of respondent characteristics is presented in Table 1.

Table 1. Respondent Characteristics

Characteristic	Dominant Category	n	%
Gender	Male	26	81.3
Age	20–30 yrs	15	46.9
Education	D-IV/S1	16	50.0
Tenure	> 6 yrs	17	53.1
Income	IDR 6–10M	20	62.5

Source: Processed data (2026)

Most respondents were male, in the productive age range of 20–30 years, held a D-IV/S1 degree, and had worked for more than 6 years. This composition reflects the characteristics of the shipping supervision and

safety sector, which demands physical readiness, adaptability, and adequate work experience.

The predominance of longer-tenured staff is particularly relevant to how the reward and punishment results should be read: employees who have spent more than six years at the institution have typically experienced multiple cycles of salary review, performance recognition, and, in some cases, disciplinary action, meaning their survey responses reflect an accumulated view of the reward and punishment system rather than a first impression. This lends additional weight to the descriptive and inferential findings that follow, since they are grounded in the perceptions of a workforce with substantial first-hand exposure to the institution's HR practices.

4.2 Descriptive Statistics of Research Variables

Before proceeding to inferential analysis, each variable's overall score was summarized to gauge how respondents generally perceived reward, punishment, and their own performance. Table 2 presents the mean score for each variable together with its qualitative category.

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics Summary

Variable	Mean Score	Category
Reward (X1)	4.72	Very High
Punishment (X2)	4.39	Very High
Employee Performance (Y)	4.35	Very High

Source: Processed data (2026)

All three variables fall into the very high category, with reward scoring the highest mean (4.72), followed by punishment (4.39) and employee performance (4.35). This pattern suggests that employees generally perceive the reward system most favorably, while punishment and their own performance are rated slightly lower but still strongly positive, indicating that both incentive and disciplinary mechanisms are functioning as intended at the institution.

Breaking reward down by its four indicators, welfare benefits recorded the highest mean (4.84), followed by career development (4.64), psychological and social recognition (4.61), and salary increases and bonuses (4.77 when both items are combined). For punishment, the heavy-sanction indicator scored highest (4.52), followed by mild punishment (4.42) and moderate punishment (4.34). Table 3 summarizes these indicator-level results.

Table 3. Indicator-Level Mean Scores

Variable / Indicator	Mean	Category
Reward: Salary & Bonuses	4.77	Very High
Reward: Welfare Benefits	4.84	Very High
Reward: Career Development	4.64	Very High
Reward: Social Recognition	4.61	Very High
Punishment: Mild Sanction	4.42	Very High
Punishment: Moderate Sanction	4.34	Very High

Variable / Indicator	Mean	Category
Punishment: Heavy Sanction	4.52	Very High

Source: Processed data (2026)

4.3 Instrument and Classical Assumption Testing

All statement items for the reward, punishment, and employee performance variables were declared valid, as the *r*-count exceeded the *r*-table value (0.361), and reliable with Cronbach's alpha values above 0.60. The classical assumption tests showed that the residual data were normally distributed (Shapiro-Wilk sig. = 0.470 > 0.05), the relationships between variables were linear (deviation from linearity sig. > 0.05), no heteroscedasticity occurred (points scattered randomly on the scatterplot), and no multicollinearity occurred (tolerance = 0.993 > 0.1 and VIF = 1.007 < 10). Thus, the regression model met all requirements for further analysis. Passing this full battery of checks before moving to hypothesis testing matters because a model that violates any of these assumptions — for instance, one with heteroscedastic residuals or highly correlated predictors — can produce coefficient estimates and significance values that are misleading, even if the raw correlations look reasonable. Confirming that KSOP Class IV Bengkalis's data satisfied every assumption therefore gives the subsequent regression, *F*-test, and *t*-test results a more solid empirical footing.

4.4 Correlation and Coefficient of Determination

Table 4. Correlation and Determination Test Results

Relationship	<i>r</i>	Sig.	Category
Reward→Performance	0.675	0.000	Strong
Punishment→Performance	0.487	0.005	Moderate
Adj. R ² (simultaneous)	0.618	–	61.8%

Source: SPSS 25 processed data (2026)

Reward showed a strong correlation with employee performance (*r* = 0.675; sig. = 0.000), while punishment showed a moderate correlation (*r* = 0.487; sig. = 0.005). The Adjusted R Square value of 0.618 indicates that reward and punishment jointly explain 61.8% of the variance in employee performance, while the remaining 38.2% is explained by other factors such as motivation, leadership, and work discipline, which were not analyzed in this study.

4.5 Multiple Linear Regression Analysis

Table 5. Multiple Linear Regression Results

Variable	B	t	Sig.
Constant	2.866	0.512	0.613
Reward (X1)	0.739	5.734	0.000
Punishment (X2)	0.483	3.890	0.001

Source: SPSS 25 processed data (2026)

Based on Table 5, the regression equation obtained is: $Y = 2.866 + 0.739X_1 + 0.483X_2$. The

constant value of 2.866 indicates that employee performance remains positive even if reward and punishment are assumed to be zero. Every additional unit of reward corresponds to a 0.739-unit gain in employee performance, and much the same pattern holds for punishment, where one added unit lifts performance by roughly 0.483 units, holding the other variable constant.

4.6 Hypothesis Testing

Table 6. F-Test and t-Test Results

Test	Count	Table	Sig.	Result
F-test (simultaneous)	26.052	3.33	0.000	H3 accepted
t-test – Reward	5.734	2.045	0.000	H1 accepted
t-test – Punishment	3.890	2.045	0.001	H2 accepted

Source: SPSS 25 processed data (2026)

The F-test results show F-count (26.052) > F-table (3.33) with sig. 0.000 < 0.05, so reward and punishment simultaneously have a positive and significant effect on employee performance. Looking at each predictor on its own, the t-test likewise points to reward ($t = 5.734$; sig. = 0.000) and punishment ($t = 3.890$; sig. = 0.001) as individually significant, positive contributors to how employees perform. On this basis, all three hypotheses proposed in the research framework are supported.

H1, which stated that reward has a positive and significant effect on employee performance, is accepted: the t-count for reward (5.734) exceeds the t-table threshold (2.045) by a comfortable margin, and its regression coefficient (0.739) is the larger of the two predictors, underscoring that raising reward levels tends to translate directly into higher performance. H2, proposing a positive and significant effect of punishment, is likewise accepted; although its t-count (3.890) and coefficient (0.483) are smaller than reward's, the effect remains statistically robust, indicating that disciplinary measures continue to shape how employees perform even where incentives are already strong. H3, predicting a joint significant effect of both variables, is supported by the F-test outcome, confirming that reward and punishment work best when considered together rather than as isolated policy levers.

Such a pattern echoes what Brilliantisyah et al. (2024) and Novalia & Candra (2024) documented elsewhere: when reward is administered appropriately, employee performance tends to follow suit. It also lines up with Sembiring & Sandra (2021), whose work similarly pointed to consistency in applying reward and punishment as a driver of stronger performance outcomes. Read together, these parallels suggest that KSOP Class IV Bengkalis stands to gain from keeping its reward and punishment practices fair, steady, and proportionate — not only to lift individual

performance but also to sustain the quality of the public services the office delivers. The fact that reward's effect size clearly outweighs punishment's in this sample also implies that, while both mechanisms matter, the institution may see faster gains by prioritizing improvements to how reward is communicated and delivered before fine-tuning its disciplinary procedures further.

4.7 Managerial Implications

Given that reward carries the stronger relationship with performance, KSOP Class IV Bengkalis would likely benefit from prioritizing timely and transparent reward distribution — for example, ensuring overtime pay and service-post allowances are disbursed promptly and that performance recognition is visible to the wider staff. At the same time, punishment should not be treated as secondary; its moderate but significant contribution suggests that clear, consistently enforced disciplinary procedures still play a meaningful role in shaping how employees perform. Management might therefore consider formalizing a written escalation scheme, ranging from verbal warnings to more serious sanctions, so that punishment is applied predictably rather than discretionarily.

Beyond the two variables studied here, the remaining 38.2% of unexplained variance points to other levers management could explore, such as leadership style, work motivation, and organizational culture. Future internal policy reviews at the institution could pair reward and punishment reforms with attention to these complementary factors to achieve a more holistic improvement in employee performance. A practical starting point would be a short annual survey covering these additional factors, allowing management to track whether performance gains from reward and punishment adjustments hold steady once other workplace conditions are also taken into account.

It is also worth noting that reward and punishment policies do not operate in a vacuum; how they are perceived often depends on how clearly they are communicated. Even a well-designed reward structure can fail to motivate staff if employees are unsure how rewards are calculated or who qualifies for them. KSOP Class IV Bengkalis may therefore benefit from pairing any policy adjustments with clearer internal communication — for instance, a short briefing or written guideline explaining how reward and punishment decisions are made — so that the fairness and consistency documented in this study's findings are also visible and understood by staff on the ground.

4.8 Limitations and Future Research

This study is limited by its relatively small sample size of 32 employees, drawn from a single institution, which constrains the

generalizability of the findings to other port authority offices with different organizational cultures or staff compositions. The cross-sectional design also captures employee performance at a single point in time rather than tracking how it evolves as reward and punishment policies are adjusted. Future research could extend this work by including a larger, multi-site sample across several KSOP branches, incorporating mediating variables such as work motivation or job satisfaction, and adopting a longitudinal design to observe how performance responds to policy changes over time.

4.9 Theoretical Contribution

Beyond its practical value for KSOP Class IV Bengkalis, this study contributes to the broader literature on human resource management in the public sector by empirically testing reward and punishment theory within a small, highly regulated government office — a setting that differs from the private-sector companies examined in most prior reward-and-punishment research (e.g., Sembiring & Sandra, 2021; Brilliantisyah et al., 2024). The finding that reward exerts a stronger influence than punishment in this context adds nuance to the theoretical assumption that both mechanisms contribute equally to performance, suggesting instead that their relative weight may depend on organizational type and the nature of employees' duties. This distinction offers a useful reference point for future studies comparing incentive-based and disciplinary mechanisms across different public-sector institutions.

The indicator-level results in Table 3 further refine this contribution: welfare benefits and heavy-sanction items emerged as the strongest-performing indicators within their respective variables, which suggests that employees at KSOP Class IV Bengkalis respond more strongly to tangible, security-oriented forms of reward and to clearly defined consequences for serious violations than to softer forms of recognition or minor sanctions. This indicator-level nuance is often missed when reward and punishment are treated only as single composite scores, and it points to a practical entry point — strengthening welfare provisions and formalizing serious-violation procedures — for institutions seeking the most efficient return on a limited HR policy budget.

It is also worth situating these results against the wider pattern in the literature reviewed in Section 2. Where Mahmudi (2019) and Novalia & Candra (2024) frame reward primarily around salary and career advancement, the present findings suggest that at a government office like KSOP Class IV Bengkalis, welfare-oriented benefits may carry comparatively more weight than career-track incentives, possibly because promotion pathways in the civil service are

governed by broader bureaucratic rules that individual offices have limited power to accelerate. This observation is offered as a hypothesis for future comparative research rather than a settled conclusion, given the modest sample size of the present study.

5. Conclusion and Recommendations

Based on the results of the analysis, it can be concluded that reward and punishment simultaneously have a positive and significant effect on the performance of KSOP Class IV Bengkalis employees ($F\text{-count } 26.052 > F\text{-table } 3.33$; sig. 0.000), with a contribution of 61.8% (Adjusted $R^2 = 0.618$). Partially, reward has a positive and significant effect on employee performance ($t = 5.734$; sig. = 0.000), as does punishment ($t = 3.890$; sig. = 0.001). A fair, consistent, and objective implementation of reward and punishment has been shown to improve employee performance and support the improvement of public service quality at the institution. The institution is advised to maintain the consistency of its reward policy while ensuring transparent implementation of punishment, so that employee performance can continue to improve sustainably. For future researchers, it is recommended to broaden the sample beyond a single institution and to include additional variables, such as work motivation or organizational culture, that may further explain variation in employee performance.

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